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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 The American system of arbitration is constantly evolving.1 From 
the first formal arbitration tribunal in 1786—established by the New 
York Chamber of Commerce2—to the creation of the Federal Arbitra-
                                                                                                                      
 * B.A., B.B.A., Mississippi State University, 2001; J.D., Florida State University, 
2004.  Many thanks to Beth Chamblee for the encouragement, support, and most of all, the 
laughter.  Thanks also to Professors Greg Mitchell and Jim Rossi for their time and in-
sight, and to Dina Munasifi for taking the time to edit this piece.  All errors, as they say, 
are my own. 
 1. See FRANCES KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION 3-8 (1948). 
 2. Id. at 4. Arbitration played an obscure and humble role in early American history. 
“It did not become an integral part of the early social and economic development of the 
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tion Act in 1925—passed to suppress judicial hostility towards arbi-
tration3—the system has continuously adapted to accommodate 
changing business practices and rising judicial concerns over the le-
gitimacy of the institution. In fact, the system’s adaptation has been 
so effective that the Supreme Court now recognizes a “national policy 
favoring arbitration.”4 
 This “national policy” is the most recent phase of the arbitration 
evolution, and it raises several concerns. Most significantly, lower 
courts are relying on it to effectively eliminate any review of arbitra-
tion agreements under state laws of unconscionability.5 Conse-
quently, banks, phone companies, and other consumer businesses are 
implementing mandatory arbitration clauses that provide complete 
immunization from both class actions and classwide arbitration. As 
potential defendants, these companies hope that courts will force in-
dividual resolution of all consumer claims against them by upholding 
their agreements to arbitrate. Such an exercise raises an important, 
yet unanswered, question: To what extent should courts use the “na-
tional policy favoring arbitration”6 to protect consumer arbitration 
agreements that prohibit all class relief?7 
                                                                                                                      
country nor a recognized institution of any consequence and its impact was negligible upon 
the growth of justice in the country.” Id. at 6. 
 3. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995); see also Federal 
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2000). 
 4. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). 
 5. See, e.g., Metro E. Ctr. for Conditioning & Health v. Qwest Communications Int’l, 
Inc., 294 F.3d 924, 927 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1090 (2002) (stating that ar-
guments to overturn agreements based on the costs of individual arbitration and the pre-
clusion of class actions—the typical unconscionability arguments—are “the sort of litany 
that the Federal Arbitration Act is supposed to silence”); Hutcherson v. Sears Roebuck & 
Co., 793 N.E.2d 886, 896 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (“Although we recognize the importance of 
class actions as a tool for protecting consumers, we cannot ignore the strong policy that fa-
vors enforcement of arbitration provisions.”). 
 6. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10. 
 7. In June of 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court avoided making a decision on whether 
classwide arbitration is permissible when an arbitration agreement is silent on the matter. 
Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. 2402 (2003). Instead, the Court remanded the 
case to the South Carolina Supreme Court with instructions that would allow the arbitra-
tor to make the class relief determination. Id. at 2407. At the very least, this decision 
proves that the Supreme Court is not completely hostile to classwide arbitration and it 
preserves a limited state role in deciding what arbitration policies are acceptable in that 
state. What the decision does not tell us, however, is how the Court will react when faced 
with an arbitration agreement that expressly prohibits all class activity. Will it defer to the 
“national policy favoring arbitration” and grant defendants virtual immunity from having 
to provide class relief?  Southland, 465 U.S. at 10. Or, will it recognize the growing dissent 
among states, and several Supreme Court Justices, who favor taking some arbitration 
oversight out of the federal sphere? As stated by the American Arbitration Association, 
“[t]he arbitrability of class arbitrations where the parties’ agreement precludes such relief 
is a developing area of the law.” American Arbitration Association Policy on Class Arbitra-
tion, at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15753&JSPaid=43408 (last visited Feb. 
29, 2004). For information on the lower court’s decision in Bazzle, see Andrea Lockridge, 
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 The Supreme Court will have an opportunity to address this ques-
tion when it resolves a split between the Seventh and Ninth Circuits 
on the interplay of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), the Federal 
Communications Act (FCA), and state laws of unconscionability.8 Es-
sentially, the Court will have to revisit previous decisions on what 
type of role states play, if any, in determining arbitration policy 
within their borders. Part II of this paper discusses the history of 
federal preemption under the FAA and the growing dissatisfaction 
with the Supreme Court’s federal preemption jurisprudence. Part III 
addresses federal preemption under the Federal Communications 
Act and how companies now use the FCA to shield arbitration 
agreements from review under state laws of unconscionability. Part 
III also discusses how the Supreme Court can develop a new federal 
preemption policy—and suppress some of the dissension over its 
prior preemption decisions—when it resolves the split between the 
Seventh and Ninth Circuits. This new proposal still recognizes the 
“national policy favoring arbitration,”9 and requires courts to respect 
arbitration agreements accordingly. However, it returns greater au-
thority over arbitration procedure to the states. Thus, when faced 
with an arbitration agreement that prohibits both class actions and 
classwide arbitration, courts may uphold the parties’ decision to arbi-
trate, but review state law to determine whether to permit arbitra-
tion to proceed on a classwide basis. Finally, Parts IV and V discuss 
the justifications for such a proposal and suggest several safeguards 
that states may want to enact to ensure that class arbitration pro-
ceedings are an efficient and effective method of alternative dispute 
resolution. 
II.   FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT 
 When the Supreme Court announced the “national policy favoring 
arbitration”10 nearly twenty years ago, it started a process of signifi-
cantly federalizing the arbitration system.11 Soon, the “national” pol-
                                                                                                                      
The Silent Treatment: Removing the Class Action from the Plaintiff’s Toolbox Without Ever 
Saying a Word, 2003 J. DISP. RESOL. 255, 264-65. 
 8. Compare Ting v. AT&T Corp., 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. 
Ct. 53 (2003) (holding (1) that the Federal Communications Act does not preempt state 
laws of unconscionability, and (2) that the FAA does preempt the California Consumer Le-
gal Remedies Act’s ban on waivers of class actions, but that the FAA makes arbitration 
agreements subject to state laws of unconscionability, which the 9th Circuit used to invali-
date the parties’ agreement in this case), with Boomer v. AT&T Corp., 309 F.3d 404 (7th 
Cir. 2002) (holding that the Federal Communication Act preempts state laws of uncon-
scionability). 
 9. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Stephen L. Hayford & Alan R. Palmiter, Arbitration Federalism: A State Role in 
Commercial Arbitration, 54 FLA. L. REV. 175, 176 (2002). Hayford and Palmiter argue for 
allowing state law to control any areas of law outside the FAA’s “strong preemptive core.” 
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icy became an “emphatic” policy,12 and other courts—both federal and 
state—were expected to respect arbitration agreements to a point 
where state law became almost insignificant. However, even though 
federal preemption under the Federal Arbitration Act has expanded 
significantly over the last two decades, the true extent of the FAA’s 
preemptive effect is not entirely clear. 
 Section 2 of the FAA provides that all arbitration agreements are 
“valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist 
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”13 Explaining 
what constitutes “grounds as exist at law or in equity,” the Supreme 
Court has emphasized that “[g]enerally applicable contract defenses, 
such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invali-
date arbitration agreements without contravening § 2 [of the FAA].”14 
Nevertheless, courts easily disagree over how far they may go in us-
ing these generally applicable defenses to overturn parties’ arbitra-
tion agreements.15 After all, even the members of the Supreme Court 
have not reached a unanimous decision on when states should defer 
to the national policy and uphold agreements under the FAA.16 And, 
some of the Supreme Court’s statements on preemption under the 
                                                                                                                      
Id. at 177. “[S]tate law in the form of default procedural rules holds out great promise, lim-
ited only by the gravitational pull of the FAA’s pro-arbitration imperative.” Id. at 178. 
 12. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 
(1985). 
 13. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). 
 14. See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 682 (1996). 
 15. See Mandel v. Household Bank (Nevada), Nat’l Ass’n, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 380, 386 
(Ct. App. 2003) (citations omitted): 
Certainly, if a state’s law disfavors arbitration and creates unreasonable hur-
dles to the enforcement of arbitration agreements governed by the FAA, it is 
preempted. But Nevada law favors arbitration of disputes, and therefore fed-
eral preemption is inapplicable. . . . [T]he proper course is to sever the ban on 
class actions and enforce the remainder of the arbitration agreement. 
Compare id., with Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 393, 396 (Ct. App. 
2003) (holding that “where a valid arbitration agreement governed by the FAA prohibits 
classwide arbitration, section 2 of the FAA preempts a state court from applying state sub-
stantive law to strike the class action waiver from the agreement”), review granted en 
banc, No. S113725, 2003 Cal. LEXIS 2105, at *1 (Cal. Rptr. Apr. 9, 2003); see also Hutch-
erson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 793 N.E.2d 886, 896 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (“Although we rec-
ognize the importance of class actions as a tool for protecting consumers, we cannot ignore 
the strong policy that favors enforcement of arbitration provisions.”). 
 16. See Doctor’s Assocs., 517 U.S. at 689 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Allied-Bruce Ter-
minix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 284 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 285 (Thomas, 
J., dissenting); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 21 (1984) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
Justice Rehnquist joined O’Connor’s dissent in Southland. Notably, Justices O’Connor, 
Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas are not alone in their displeasure over the Supreme Court’s 
expansion of the FAA. In Allied-Bruce, twenty state attorneys general signed an amicus 
brief asking the Court to overturn Southland. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 284 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting). 
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FAA have created uncertainty about the extent of a state lawmaking 
role in the new arbitration system.17  
 Recently, lower courts have examined these questions quite fre-
quently. The reason is that national consumer companies are hiding 
behind federal laws—namely, the FAA and the FCA—in an attempt 
to protect arbitration provisions that preclude all forms of class re-
lief.18 Not surprisingly, these lower courts differ on what role federal 
preemption should play in protecting such clauses from review under 
state laws of unconscionability.19 This Section will give a brief de-
scription of the federal preemption doctrine, discuss federal preemp-
tion under the FAA, and then address the growing discontent over 
the Supreme Court’s FAA preemption jurisprudence. 
A.   Background on the Federal Preemption Doctrine 
 Article VI of the U.S. Constitution sets forth the principle that 
federal law is supreme,20 and the preemption doctrine outlines the 
boundaries of that principle when federal legislation leaves any 
doubt. Therefore, “[t]he purpose of preemption doctrine . . . is to de-
fine the sphere of control between federal and state law when they 
conflict, or appear to conflict.”21  
 Under the doctrine, federal law can displace state law in one of 
three ways: (1) express preemption, (2) field preemption, or (3) con-
                                                                                                                      
 17. Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 11, at 176. On one hand, the Court interprets the 
FAA to trump state laws that undermine the enforcement of arbitration. On the other, the 
court recognizes states’ ability to employ generally applicable contract defenses to invali-
date parties’ agreements. Id. at 176-77. 
 18. Some courts protect companies’ arbitration agreements under the guise of the 
Federal Arbitration Act, holding that the FAA completely preempts state efforts to reform 
contracts through their state laws of unconscionability. See, e.g., Discover Bank, 129 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d at 396; see also Hutcherson, 793 N.E.2d at 896. Some find that other federal laws, 
such as the Federal Communications Act, have this same effect. See Boomer v. AT&T 
Corp., 309 F.3d 404 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 19. Compare Ting v. AT&T Corp., 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding (1) that the 
Federal Communications Act does not preempt state laws of unconscionability, and (2) that 
the FAA does preempt the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act’s ban on waivers of 
class actions, but that the FAA makes arbitration agreements subject to state laws of un-
conscionability, which the 9th Circuit used to invalidate the parties’ agreement in this 
case), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 53 (2003), with Boomer, 309 F.3d at 404 (holding that the 
Federal Communications Act preempts state laws of unconscionability); see also Hutcher-
son, 793 N.E.2d at 896 (“Although we recognize the importance of class actions as a tool for 
protecting consumers, we cannot ignore the strong policy that favors enforcement of arbi-
tration provisions.”). 
 20. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 21. Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. 
REV. 967, 968 (2002). “To the extent that the Supreme Court has something to say about 
the power struggle of federalism, it speaks, partially at least, through its preemption deci-
sions.” Id. at 969. “True preemption doctrine . . . was in its infancy until the unprecedented 
legislative activity of the post-Depression era. Until that time, the Court was faced with 
little truly comprehensive legislation of the kind that the 1930s and 1940s produced.” Id. 
at 973-74. 
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flict preemption.22 Express preemption exists where a federal statute 
explicitly withdraws specific powers from the states.23 The Supreme 
Court favors a narrow reading of statutes that attempt to keep power 
in the federal sphere, believing that courts should apply a presump-
tion against preemption when the statutes interfere with the states’ 
traditional powers.24 An inquiry under the principle of express pre-
emption requires a court to interpret the meaning of the preemptive 
clause and determine whether Congress actually had the power to 
pass such legislation.25 
 Absent explicit preemptive text, courts may still conclude that a 
federal statute is so comprehensive that Congress left no room for 
supplementary state regulation.26 This so-called field preemption oc-
curs when a statute or regulation reflects a dominant federal interest 
that precludes enforcement of any similar state laws on the subject.27 
Since the statute contains no explicit statement of preemption, a field 
preemption inquiry requires the court to find preemption implicit 
within the federal law.28 Because of the uncertainty in finding an im-
plied statutory intent, courts hesitate to read preemption into a fed-
eral statute.29 
 Finally, even when Congress has not completely occupied the 
field, courts may still infer preemption when federal law and state 
law conflict. Conflict preemption exists when “compliance with both 
federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,”30 or where 
                                                                                                                      
 22. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 226 (2000); see also Pac. Gas & 
Elec. Co. v. Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983). 
 23. Nelson, supra note 22, at 226. 
 24. Id. at 227. But see Davis, supra note 21, at 968 (arguing that the Supreme Court 
actually holds a presumption in favor of preemption). 
 25. Nelson, supra note 22, at 226-27. In cases involving the FAA and FCA, for exam-
ple, courts examine Congress’ regulatory powers under the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., 
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11 (1984) (stating that the FAA rested “on the au-
thority of Congress to enact substantive rules under the Commerce Clause”). 
 26. Nelson, supra note 22, at 227 (citing English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 
(1990)). 
 27. Id. (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. The Supreme Court developed the field preemption doctrine in Southern Rail-
way Co. v. Reid, 222 U.S. 424 (1912). Reid involved freight regulations under the Inter-
state Commerce Act. Mrs. Reid asked Southern Railway to ship several packages from 
North Carolina to West Virginia, but Southern refused to ship the packages until it could 
establish a rate for the shipment (no federal regulation existed to establish rates for that 
route). Mrs. Reid sued under a North Carolina statute that awarded damages—$25 a 
day—against rail companies that refused to accept packages, and she won. Id. at 431-34. 
Southern appealed the decision all the way to the Supreme Court, which concluded that 
even though no federal law specifically applied to the plaintiff’s claim, the Interstate 
Commerce Act’s broad regulatory authority was enough to evidence that Congress had oc-
cupied the field. It did not matter that the state regulation complemented the federal 
scheme. Id. at 437-38. 
 30. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963). “The test 
of whether both federal and state regulations may operate, or the state regulation must 
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state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution 
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”31 While the “physical 
impossibility” portion of this test is fairly narrow, the “obstacle” half 
is fairly broad.32 It potentially applies not only in cases where state 
and federal law conflict, but also where courts think that the effects 
of state law obstruct the intended accomplishments of federal law.33 
In fact, the Supreme Court relies on obstacle preemption to uphold 
arbitration agreements under the FAA, even when such agreements 
are offensive to state law or policies.34  
B.   The Expanding Preemptive Effect of the FAA 
 When Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act in 1925, it at-
tempted to overcome a history of judicial hostility toward predispute 
arbitration agreements.35 The FAA has been an undeniable success 
in that regard. Supreme Court decisions over the last seventy-five 
years have relied on broad interpretations of the FAA to establish 
arbitration as a near sacred institution for dispute resolution in the 
United States.36 In fact, the Court has employed these broad inter-
pretations to make the FAA applicable in both federal and state 
courts, effectively expanding the preemptive scope of the FAA far be-
yond Congress’ original intent.37  
                                                                                                                      
give way, is whether both regulations can be enforced without impairing the federal super-
intendence of the field, not whether they are aimed at similar or different objectives.” Id. at 
142. 
 31. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).  
 32. Nelson, supra note 22, at 228. 
 33. Id. at 228-29.  
 34. See, e.g., Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (invalidating a 
Montana statutory notice requirement). The Court holds that inconsistent state laws 
should not apply when they pose obstacles to the implementation of comprehensive federal 
legislation such as the FAA. See id. at 688. 
 35. See Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 11, at 180. Although arbitration is an ex-
tremely old form of dispute resolution—dating back to ancient Greece—the judicial hostil-
ity grew out of the lack of available records of how parties used arbitration and a lack of 
any organizing arbitral body. See KELLOR, supra note 1, at 3-5. 
 36. According to the Supreme Court, the FAA’s support for arbitration is even more 
powerful when dealing with international disputes. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 
U.S. 506 (1974). 
 37. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395, 420 (1967) (Black, 
J., dissenting) (stating that “there are clear indications in the legislative history that the 
Act was not intended to make arbitration agreements enforceable in state courts”); South-
land Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 25 (1984) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 One rarely finds a legislative history as unambiguous as the FAA’s. That his-
tory establishes conclusively that the 1925 Congress viewed the FAA as a pro-
cedural statute, applicable only in federal courts, derived, Congress believed, 
largely from the federal power to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 
 In 1925[,] Congress emphatically believed arbitration to be a matter of “pro-
cedure.” At hearings on the Act congressional Subcommittees were told: “The 
theory on which you do this is that you have the right to tell the Federal courts 
how to proceed.” 
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 Originally, Congress passed the FAA as a procedural statute that 
applied only in federal courts.38 “State arbitration law continued to 
govern in state courts, even if the contract involved interstate com-
merce.”39 However, to develop a “national policy favoring arbitra-
tion,”40 the Supreme Court had to adopt a more liberal interpretation 
of the FAA after its 1938 decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.41 
Erie eliminated the federal courts’ power to create national commer-
cial policy in diversity cases, and held that only state procedural law 
applied in state courts.42 Therefore, after Erie, if the Court inter-
preted the FAA as a procedural statute that was based on Congress’ 
power to regulate federal courts, then the FAA could not apply in 
state courts or federal diversity actions. However, if the Court inter-
preted the FAA as substantive federal law that was based on Con-
gress’ Commerce Clause powers, for example, then the Court would 
make it possible for the FAA to apply in both.43 Thus, after Erie, the 
Supreme Court had to decide: (1) whether the FAA was procedural or 
substantive federal law, and (2) whether Congress passed the FAA 
under its authority to regulate federal courts or under its powers to 
regulate interstate commerce.44 
 The Court addressed these issues for the first time in 1945 when 
it decided Guaranty Trust Co. v. York.45 In York, the Supreme Court 
held that federal courts sitting in diversity should not apply federal 
rules that substantially affect the enforcement of rights given by the 
state.46 Accordingly, outcome determinative state arbitration stan-
dards would trump the FAA’s arbitration mandate in diversity 
cases.47 Thus, the Court’s decision in York made it seem like the 
Court would continue with a narrow interpretation of the FAA. 
                                                                                                                      
Id. (citing Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and 
H.R. 646 Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 17 (1924) (tes-
timony of Mr. Cohen, American Bar Association)); see also Christopher R. Drahozal, “Un-
fair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 701.  
 38. Drahozal, supra note 37, at 701. Notably, the FAA does not create independent 
federal question jurisdiction. Southland, 465 U.S. at 16 n.9; Hayford & Palmiter, supra 
note 11, at 184.  
 39. Drahozal, supra note 37, at 701 (citing 1 IAN R. MACNEIL, ET AL., FEDERAL 
ARBITRATION LAW § 14.1 n.1 (Supp. 1999)). Currently, if an arbitration agreement even af-
fects interstate commerce then the FAA governs. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 
513 U.S. 265, 273-74 (1995). Thus, state courts deciding arbitration cases have to perform 
a “reverse-Erie” analysis to determine when they have to apply the FAA.  
 40. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10. 
 41. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).  
 42. Id. at 78.  
 43. Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s 
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 651 (1996). 
 44. Id.   
 45. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).  
 46. Id. at 109. 
 47. See Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 11, at 186-87.  
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 Twelve years later, however, the Court applied York’s “outcome 
determinative” test in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America and 
reached a slightly different conclusion.48 In Bernhardt, the Court 
found that the FAA was substantive federal law under York—which 
presumably would trump outcome determinative state arbitration 
standards—because it substantially affected causes of action created 
by the state.49 However, the Court refused to apply the FAA in this 
case because the underlying transaction did not involve interstate 
commerce.50 Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas emphasized 
that courts should interpret the FAA narrowly to avoid intruding on 
a state’s right to regulate substantive law.51 Nevertheless, even 
though the Court did not apply the FAA, by characterizing the FAA 
as substantive federal law, Bernhardt opened the door for the Court 
to apply the FAA to future diversity cases and state court actions as 
well.52  
 The progressive federalization of the FAA continued when, eight 
years after Bernhardt, in 1965, the Supreme Court decided that fed-
eral policy would in fact overrule conflicting state policy, even if fed-
eral policy would determine the outcome of the case.53 The Court soon 
applied this new rule in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin 
Manufacturing, a federal diversity action that was a significant piece 
of the FAA federalization process.54 In Prima Paint, the majority 
stated that “it is clear beyond dispute that the federal arbitration 
statute is based upon and confined to the incontestable federal foun-
dations of control over interstate commerce.”55 Thus, since the Court 
decided that Congress passed the FAA under the Commerce Clause, 
FAA standards—not conflicting state standards—would thereafter 
                                                                                                                      
 48. 350 U.S. 198 (1956). Bernhardt was also a diversity action. Id. at 199. 
 49. Id. at 199; see also Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 
1, 26 n.32 (1983) (stating that the FAA creates a body of federal substantive law). 
 50. Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 200-02. The FAA only applies to maritime contracts or con-
tracts involving interstate commerce. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). However, the Supreme Court 
recently interpreted § 2’s involving interstate commerce requirement to include any con-
tract that affected interstate commerce. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 
U.S. 265, 273-74 (1995). This liberal interpretation of § 2 essentially expands the FAA to 
cover even contracts that only affect intrastate commerce. See id.; see also Wickard v. Fil-
burn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (sustaining the federal power to regulate production of wheat 
where production was not intended in any part for interstate commerce but wholly for con-
sumption on the individual’s farm). 
 51. Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 202-04. 
 52. Sternlight, supra note 43, at 651-52. 
 53. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473 (1965) (“The purpose of the Erie doctrine, 
even as extended in York and Ragan, was never to bottle up federal courts with ‘outcome-
determinative’ and ‘integral-relations’ stoppers—when there are ‘affirmative countervail-
ing [federal] considerations’ and when there is a Congressional mandate . . . supported by 
constitutional authority.”) (quoting Lumbermen’s Mutual Casualty Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 
759, 764 (5th Cir. 1973)). 
 54. See 388 U.S. 395 (1967). 
 55. Id. at 405. 
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govern the legitimacy of arbitration clauses in federal diversity cases 
involving interstate commerce.56 Moreover, as Justice Black noted in 
his dissent, “when Congress exercises its authority to enact substan-
tive federal law under the Commerce Clause, it normally creates 
rules that are enforceable in state as well as federal courts.”57 There-
fore, even though Prima Paint was a diversity action, and could not 
expressly find that the FAA should apply in state court, “the conclu-
sion that the FAA was substantive law based on the Commerce 
Clause would predictably require application of the FAA in state 
court under the Supremacy Clause.”58 
 Accordingly, Prima Paint signaled two fundamental changes in 
the Supreme Court’s view on federal preemption under the FAA.59 
First, making the FAA applicable in federal diversity cases—even if 
it affected the outcome of a case—reflected a willingness to draw ju-
risdictional lines that strongly favored arbitration.60 Second, the de-
cision eliminated all possibilities of applying state arbitration law in 
federal court.61 However, forum selection was still extremely impor-
tant after Prima Paint.62 Since the FAA did not apply in state court, 
and since state arbitration law did not apply in federal court, an ar-
bitration clause might be valid in federal court under the FAA but 
worthless in state court under state law.63 This would eventually 
change with the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Southland Corp. 
v. Keating.64 
 Southland is perhaps the most controversial case in the Supreme 
Court’s history of arbitration jurisprudence. It involved individual 
and class actions brought by 7-Eleven franchisees against the fran-
chisor—Southland—for fraud, breach of contract, and violation of 
disclosure requirements under the California Franchise Investment 
Law (CFIL).65 Southland moved to compel arbitration according to a 
clause in the franchise agreement which stated that “[a]ny . . . claim 
arising out of or relating to this Agreement . . . shall be settled by ar-
bitration in accordance with the Rules of the American Arbitration 
Association.”66 The California Supreme Court granted the motion to 
compel arbitration on all issues except for those arising under the 
                                                                                                                      
 56. See id. 
 57. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984) (citing Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 
420). 
 58. Sternlight, supra note 43, at 657. 
 59. Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 11, at 189.  
 60. Id. 
 61. Id.  
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
 65. Id. at 4. 
 66. Id. 
2004]               CONSUMER ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 1015 
 
CFIL, interpreting California’s Franchise Investment Law to require 
judicial consideration of claims arising under that statute.67 The 
court also concluded that the CFIL did not conflict with the FAA.68  
 The United States Supreme Court, however, disagreed and found 
that even claims under the CFIL were subject to the arbitration 
agreement. The Court stated that if the CFIL rendered arbitration 
agreements involving commerce unenforceable, then it would conflict 
with § 2 of the FAA.69 “In enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress 
declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the 
power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of 
claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitra-
tion.”70 Therefore, according to the Court, the FAA now applied in 
state courts as long as the underlying contract involved interstate 
commerce.71  
 In subsequent decisions, the Court would rely on the new “na-
tional policy” from Southland as the underpinning of its preemption 
jurisprudence.72 In Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, the Su-
preme Court completed its revision of the FAA by interpreting § 2’s 
coverage of transactions involving interstate commerce73 to also in-
clude transactions affecting commerce.74 This expansive interpreta-
tion of § 2 significantly increased the scope of the FAA and arguably 
eliminated the need for making a distinction between interstate and 
intrastate transactions.75 Thus, Allied-Bruce completed the Supreme 
Court’s fifty-year expansion of the FAA. Almost any arbitration 
                                                                                                                      
 67. Id. Based on the superior court’s decision, the franchisees petitioned the Califor-
nia Court of Appeal to allow arbitration to proceed on a classwide basis. Id. at 4. The court 
of appeal found that no “insurmountable obstacle” existed to prevent classwide arbitration 
and it issued a writ of mandate ordering the superior court to conduct class certification 
proceedings. Id. at 5. On appeal from the court of appeal’s decision, the California Supreme 
Court agreed that classwide arbitration is feasible and it also remanded the case to the su-
perior court for class certification procedures. Id. at 5. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, 
refused to hear the classwide arbitration issue, stating that Southland did not contend, 
and the California Courts did not decide, whether classwide arbitration would conflict with 
the FAA. Id. at 8-9. 
 68. Id. at 5. 
 69. Id. at 10. 
 70. Id.  
 71. See id.  
 72. See Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 11, at 192 (citing Mastrobuono v. Shearson 
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 56 (1995); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987)). 
 73. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). The FAA applies to any “mari-
time transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce.” Id. 
 74. 513 U.S. 265, 273-74 (1995); see also Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 
2037 (2003) (accepting an equally broad definition of transactions involving commerce in a 
dispute between an Alabama builder and an Alabama lender). 
 75. See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 273-74; see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 
(1942) (sustaining the federal power to regulate production of wheat where production was 
not intended in any part for interstate commerce but wholly for consumption on the indi-
vidual’s farm). 
1016  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:1005 
 
agreement—regardless of judicial forum or interstate/intrastate na-
ture—may now fall under the FAA and its national policy in favor of 
arbitration.76  
C.   Fifty Years of Dissent 
 Justice Frankfurter was one of the first Supreme Court Justices to 
recognize the Court’s attempt at expanding the preemptive effect of 
the Federal Arbitration Act beyond Congress’ original intent.77 He be-
lieved that the FAA—which Congress passed in 1925—rested solely 
on Congress’ ability to pass general federal law that would be appli-
cable in federal diversity actions.78 However, since the Supreme 
Court’s 1938 decision in Erie negated Congress’ power to pass such 
laws, Frankfurter believed that the FAA was unconstitutional as ap-
plied in diversity cases.79 Justice Black, in a dissent joined by Jus-
tices Douglas and Stewart, picked up on this line of reasoning in his 
Prima Paint dissent when he criticized the majority for “statutory 
mutilation.”80 Disapproving of the majority’s opinion that Congress 
created substantive federal law when it drafted the FAA, Justice 
Black stated: 
[T]here are clear indications in the legislative history that the Act 
was not intended to make arbitration agreements enforceable in 
state courts or to provide an independent federal-question basis for 
jurisdiction in federal courts apart from diversity jurisdiction. The 
absence of both of these effects—which normally follow from legis-
lation of federal substantive law—seems to militate against the 
view that Congress was creating a body of federal substantive 
law.81 
 Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion almost twenty years later 
in Southland, agreed that Congress passed the FAA as a procedural 
measure; however, Stevens also believed that intervening develop-
ments compelled a finding that the FAA was now substantive federal 
                                                                                                                      
 76. See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 282 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The reading of § 2 
adopted today will displace many state statutes carefully calibrated to protect consumers . 
. . .”). In Allied-Bruce, twenty state attorneys general signed an amicus brief asking the 
Court to overturn Southland. Id. at 284 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 77. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 208 (1956) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring) (arguing that the Court should construe the FAA so as to avoid its applica-
tion in diversity cases). 
 78. See id. 
 79. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395, 416-18 (1967) 
(Black, J., dissenting). 
 80. See id. at 416 (Black, J., dissenting). “[I]t is clear that Congress in passing the Act 
relied primarily on its power to create general federal rules to govern federal courts.” Id. at 
418 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 81. Id. at 420 (Black, J., dissenting). 
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law.82 Nevertheless, Justice Stevens did advocate leaving a role in 
developing arbitration policies to the states, finding that the FAA 
“leaves room for the implementation of certain substantive state poli-
cies that would be undermined by enforcing certain categories of ar-
bitration clauses.”83 Justices O’Connor and Rehnquist, dissenting in 
Southland, agreed. However, they took it a step further, arguing that 
the FAA should not apply in state court at all, and declaring that the 
majority opinion, “utterly fail[ed] to recognize the clear congressional 
intent underlying the FAA.”84  
 Ever since Southland, Justice O’Connor has continuously ex-
pressed her distaste for the Court’s preemption jurisprudence. In Al-
lied-Bruce, for example, she noted that “over the past decade, the 
Court has abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congressional in-
tent with respect to the Federal Arbitration Act, building instead, 
case by case, an edifice of its own creation.”85 Notably, other current 
members of the Court recognize the validity of O’Connor’s position 
and have expressed a desire to preserve a greater state role in decid-
ing arbitration policies. Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas, for 
example, all agree that the FAA should not apply in state courts, and 
they support the idea of reversing Southland.86  
 Thus, given the growing dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court’s 
preemption decisions,87 it seems likely that something will soon 
change. As it stands, four Justices support overturning Southland.88 
                                                                                                                      
 82. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 17 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). “Although Justice [O’Connor]’s review of the legislative history of 
the Federal Arbitration Act demonstrates that the 1925 Congress that enacted the statute 
viewed the statute as essentially procedural in nature, I am persuaded that the interven-
ing developments in the law compel the conclusion that the Court has reached.” Id.  
 83. Id. at 18. Justice Stevens also stated that courts “should not refuse to exercise in-
dependent judgment concerning the conditions under which an arbitration agreement . . . 
can be held invalid as contrary to public policy simply because the source of the substan-
tive law to which the arbitration agreement attaches is a State rather than the Federal 
Government.” Id. at 21. 
 84. Id. at 22-23 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist joined Justice 
O’Connor’s dissent. See id. 
 85. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J., con-
curring). Allied-Bruce involved the Court’s interpretation of “transactions involving com-
merce.” O’Connor stated her belief that the FAA should only apply in federal court, but 
concurred with the Court’s judgment to maintain a uniform FAA application standard in 
state and federal courts. Id. at 282. 
 86. See id. at 284 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 285-86 (Thomas, J., dissenting); South-
land, 465 U.S. at 22 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 
517 U.S. 681, 689 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 87. Justices O’Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas are not alone in their displeas-
ure over the Supreme Court’s expansion of the FAA. In Allied-Bruce, twenty state attor-
neys general signed an amicus brief asking the Court to overturn Southland. Allied-Bruce, 
513 U.S. at 284 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 88. See Doctor’s Assocs., 517 U.S. at 689 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Allied-Bruce, 
513 U.S. at 284 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 285-86 (Thomas, J., dissenting); South-
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While the Court might not go that far, it might reach a compromise, 
leaving intact the “national policy favoring arbitration,”89 but return-
ing some limited power over arbitration procedure to the states. Part 
III discusses a split between the Seventh and Ninth Circuits that 
provides the opportunity for the Court to make this change.  
III.   FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS ACT 
 The Supreme Court will have an opportunity to address some of 
the problems with Southland and answer some important questions 
about waivers of class relief, when it resolves a circuit split over the 
preemptive effect that the Federal Communications Act (FCA) may 
or may not have over the FAA and state laws of unconscionability.90 
The split arises from an AT&T Consumer Services Agreement that 
prohibited its customers from pursuing class actions and classwide 
arbitration.91 The Seventh Circuit upheld the agreement under the 
FCA,92 and the Ninth Circuit invalidated the agreement under the 
FAA.93  
 Resolving this split will allow the Supreme Court to develop a new 
preemption policy that respects the interests of both plaintiffs and 
defendants by: (1) encouraging courts to respect the parties’ decision 
to arbitrate, yet (2) returning limited powers to the states to regulate 
the procedural aspects of arbitration. Essentially, the new policy will 
continue to recognize the “national policy favoring arbitration,”94 
while allowing state law to decide whether to permit arbitration to 
proceed on a classwide basis.  
A.   The Federal Communications Act and the Filed Rate Doctrine 
 Congress passed the Federal Communications Act of 193495 par-
tially in an effort to address AT&T’s virtual monopoly over the na-
tion’s telephone services industry.96 Under the Act, long distance car-
                                                                                                                      
land, 465 U.S. at 22 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist joined O’Connor’s dissent 
in Southland. Id. 
 89. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10. 
 90. Compare Ting v. AT&T Corp., 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding (1) that the 
Federal Communications Act does not preempt state laws of unconscionability, and (2) that 
the FAA does preempt the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act’s ban on waivers of 
class actions, but that the FAA makes arbitration agreements subject to state laws of un-
conscionability, which the 9th Circuit used to invalidate the parties’ agreement in this 
case), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 53 (2003), with Boomer v. AT&T Corp., 309 F.3d 404 (7th Cir. 
2002) (holding that the Federal Communication Act preempts state laws of unconscionabil-
ity).  
 91. See Ting, 319 F.3d at 1130; Boomer, 309 F.3d at 408. 
 92. Boomer, 309 F.3d at 408. 
 93. Ting, 319 F.3d at 1130. 
 94. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10. 
 95. Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-615 (2000).  
 96. See Ting, 319 F.3d at 1130. 
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riers—namely, AT&T—had to file all terms and conditions of their 
customer service agreements with the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC).97 Widely known as the “filed rate doctrine,”98 this 
provision of the FCA ensured that “all purchasers of communications 
services receive[d] the same federally regulated rates” by prohibiting 
regulated entities from charging rates other than those listed in their 
duly filed tariff.99 In other words, the filed rate doctrine prevented 
consumers from having to pay unequal or discriminatory rates based 
on their geographic location.100 
 By the late 1970s, however, technological advances had reduced 
entry costs into the telecommunications market, and some of AT&T’s 
new competitors began voicing concerns that a continuation of the 
filed rate doctrine imposed unnecessary costs on new entrants.101 
Based on these complaints, the FCC adopted a policy of “detar-
iffing”102 and—over a fifteen year period103—began exempting “non-
dominant carriers” from the FCA filing requirement.104 However, the 
Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the FCA did not give the 
FCC the power to issue these exemptions.105 As a result of the Su-
preme Court’s decision, the FCC had to wait for Congress to act if it 
wanted to suspend the filed rate doctrine.106 
 Two years after the Supreme Court denied the FCC the power to 
exempt certain carriers,107 Congress responded by passing the Tele-
communications Act of 1996.108 The purpose of the Act was to open all 
telecommunications markets and provide for a pro-competitive, de-
regulated national policy framework.109 Through the Act, Congress 
gave the FCC express authority to refrain from applying the filed 
                                                                                                                      
 97. See Boomer, 309 F.3d at 408; see also 47 U.S.C. § 203 (2000) (“filed rate doctrine”). 
 98. The filed rate doctrine is the common name for the section of the Federal Commu-
nications Act that was codified in § 203 of the United States Code. See Federal Communi-
cations Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 203 (2000).   
 99. See Ting, 319 F.3d at 1130-31 (alteration in original) (quoting ICOM Holding, Inc. 
v. MCI Worldcom, Inc., 238 F.3d 219, 221 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
 100. See id. at 1131. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 1132-33. The FCC’s new policy started off as “mandatory detariffing” for all 
nondominant carriers, but the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that the 
FCC did not have such powers under the FCA. See id. at 1132; MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. 
FCC, 765 F.2d 1186, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Afterwards, the FCC attempted to enact a pol-
icy of “permissive detariffing,” but the Supreme Court invalidated this new policy as well. 
See Ting, 319 F.3d at 1132; MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 512 U.S. 218, 234 
(1994). 
 103. Ting, 319 F.3d at 1132. 
 104. Boomer v. AT&T Corp., 309 F.3d 404, 408 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 105. See MCI, 512 U.S. at 234.  
 106. Ting, 319 F.3d at 1132. 
 107. See MCI, 512 U.S. at 234.  
 108. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
 109. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-458, at 113 (1996) (emphasis added). 
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rate doctrine if the FCC determined that enforcement of the provi-
sion was not necessary to ensure that the charges and practices of 
carriers were just and reasonable.110  
 Under its new authority, the FCC issued a series of orders notify-
ing AT&T—and the other long distance carriers—that they no longer 
had to comply with the filed rate doctrine.111 Instead, carriers had to 
establish contracts covering rates, terms, and conditions of service 
directly with their customers.112 Unclear on the effects of the order, 
AT&T asked the FCC to clarify whether it intended to subject tele-
communication contracts to state contract law.113 In response, the 
FCC stated that the FCA “continues to govern determinations as to 
whether rates, terms, and conditions for interstate . . . services are 
just and reasonable.”114 However, the Commission went on to state 
that “consumers may have remedies under state consumer protection 
and contract laws as to issues regarding the legal relationship be-
tween the carrier and customer.”115 
 Soon after the FCC’s response, AT&T started mailing its custom-
ers a Consumer Services Agreement (CSA) containing all rates, 
terms, and conditions of service for AT&T’s state-to-state and inter-
national long distance plans.116 The CSA also described AT&T’s new 
binding arbitration process.117 This provision of the CSA spawned the 
litigation in the Seventh and Ninth Circuits.118 
 The CSA’s binding arbitration provision barred all of AT&T’s long 
distance customers from pursuing claims against the company 
through either class action or classwide arbitration.119 Several con-
sumers in the Seventh and Ninth Circuits sued AT&T, alleging that 
the company’s elimination of potential class relief through manda-
tory arbitration clauses violated their respective state laws of uncon-
scionability.120 AT&T claimed that the Federal Communications Act 
mandated federal regulation of long distance contracts, and there-
                                                                                                                      
 110. Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 160(a)(1) (2000). 
 111. See Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace, 14 F.C.C.R. 6004 (1999); Interstate, 
Interexchange Marketplace, 12 F.C.C.R. 15,014 (1997); Interstate, Interexchange Market-
place, 11 F.C.C.R. 20,730 (1996). 
 112. See Boomer v. AT&T Corp., 309 F.3d 404, 409 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 113. Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace, 12 F.C.C.R. 15,014, 15,056 (1997) (order 
on reconsideration). AT&T’s request for clarification was based on one statement in the 
original FCC order: “[C]onsumers will also be able to pursue remedies under state con-
sumer protection and contract laws.” Id. 
 114. Id. at 15,057. 
 115. Id. (emphasis added). 
 116. Boomer, 309 F.3d at 409. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See Ting v. AT&T Corp., 319 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. 
Ct. 53 (2003); Boomer, 309 F.3d at 408. 
 119. See Ting, 319 F.3d at 1130; Boomer, 309 F.3d at 408. 
 120. See Ting, 319 F.3d at 1130; Boomer, 309 F.3d at 408. 
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fore, that the FCA preempted state laws that would undermine their 
Consumer Services Agreement.121 The Seventh Circuit agreed and 
upheld the parties’ agreement to arbitrate.122 The Ninth Circuit, 
however, decided that the FAA, and its exception for applying state 
laws of general applicability (i.e., unconscionability), should prevail 
over the FCA.123 Based on this reasoning, the Ninth Circuit invali-
dated the arbitration agreement under California’s laws of uncon-
scionability.124 
 As the following Sections explain, the Seventh Circuit came to the 
appropriate substantive conclusion by upholding the parties’ agree-
ment to arbitrate. However, it followed the wrong procedure by bas-
ing its decision on the preemptive power of the FCA. It should have 
taken the path of the Ninth Circuit and reviewed the validity of the 
parties’ agreement under the FAA. Unlike the Ninth Circuit, how-
ever, it should have stricken any unconscionable provisions rather 
than invalidating the entire agreement. 
B.   The Seventh & Ninth Circuits’ Views on the Preemptive Effect of 
the Federal Communications Act 
 AT&T insisted that a state law challenge to the legality of the 
CSA violated Congress’ objective in creating the Communications 
Act, and that it specifically conflicted with the objectives of sections 
201 and 202 of the FCA.125 Sections 201 and 202 place substantive 
prohibitions on a carrier’s ability to employ unreasonable or dis-
criminatory rates,126 and AT&T claimed that these provisions pre-
empt any state law challenges because they show a congressional in-
                                                                                                                      
 121. See Ting, 319 F.3d at 1130; Boomer, 309 F.3d at 408. 
 122. Boomer, 309 F.3d at 418 n.6. 
 123. Ting, 319 F.3d at 1152; see also Note, State Regulation of Radio and Television, 73 
HARV. L. REV. 386, 388-89 (1959) (arguing that when the FCA does not specifically cover 
an activity, “state regulation should be permitted at least until the federal government 
chooses to act”). 
 124. Ting, 319 F.3d at 1152. 
 125. See id. at 1137; Boomer, 309 F.3d at 417. 
 126. See Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-202 (2000). Section 
201(b) states: 
 All charges, practices, classifications, and regulations for and in connection 
with such communication service, shall be just and reasonable, and any such 
charge, practice, classification, or regulation that is unjust or unreasonable is 
declared to be unlawful. 
Section 202(a) provides: 
 It shall be unlawful for any common carrier to make any unjust or unreason-
able discrimination in charges, practices, classifications, regulations, facilities, 
or services for or in connection with like communication service, directly or in-
directly, by any means or device, or to make or give any undue or unreasonable 
preference or advantage to any particular person, class of persons, or locality, 
or to subject any particular person, class of persons, or locality to any undue or 
unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage. 
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tent for federal law to regulate telecommunications contracts.127 The 
Seventh Circuit agreed for three reasons. 
 First, it stated that sections 201 and 202, and the FCA in general, 
demonstrate a congressional intent that long-distance customers 
should “receive uniform rates, terms[,] and conditions of service.”128 
Allowing state law challenges to the arbitration agreement would re-
sult in customers in different states “receiving different terms based 
on their locality.”129 According to the Seventh Circuit, this violates § 
202’s prohibition of providing preferences based on geographic loca-
tion.130 Second, AT&T’s implementation of an arbitration clause sup-
posedly allows it to offer lower rates to customers.131 Accordingly, al-
lowing state law challenges to the arbitration agreement might re-
sult in varying rate structures for customers in different states, and 
the court felt that this would also be a violation of § 202.132 Finally, § 
201 declares any rates, terms, and conditions that are unjust and un-
reasonable to be unlawful.133 According to the Seventh Circuit, this 
demonstrates Congress’ intent that federal law should govern terms 
and conditions of telecommunication service contracts.134 Based on 
this reasoning, the court upheld the parties’ agreement to arbi-
trate.135 
 While the Seventh Circuit’s decision to send the parties to arbitra-
tion was substantively correct, it was procedurally inaccurate be-
cause it held that the FCA preempts state laws of unconscionability. 
The court should have upheld the parties’ agreement to arbitrate un-
der the FAA, and then reviewed state law to determine whether to 
allow the arbitration to proceed on a classwide basis.136 As the Ninth 
Circuit held, the Federal Communications Act does not preempt state 
laws.137 While sections 201 and 202 of the 1934 Act unquestionably 
demonstrate a congressional intent that customers should receive 
                                                                                                                      
 127. See Ting, 319 F.3d at 1137-38; Boomer, 309 F.3d at 418.  
 128. Boomer, 309 F.3d at 418. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 419. 
 131. See id. at 418. AT&T did not offer any empirical evidence to support this claim. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000).  
 134. Boomer, 309 F.3d at 418. 
 135. Id. at 424. 
 136. On this point, the Ninth Circuit also made an inappropriate decision; it invali-
dated the parties’ entire agreement. Ting v. AT&T Corp., 319 F.3d 1126, 1152 (9th Cir. 
2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 53 (2003). The Ninth Circuit should have sent the parties to 
arbitration and let state law determine whether arbitration may proceed on a classwide 
basis. California, by the way, is one of only a few states that so far has explicitly accepted 
classwide arbitration as a legitimate form of alternative dispute resolution. See Blue Cross 
of Cal. v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779, 794 (Ct. App. 1998) (concluding that the 
FAA does not preempt California’s state law that allows classwide arbitration when the 
arbitration agreement is silent on the issue).  
 137. Ting, 319 at 1152. 
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reasonable rates, terms, and services,138 these provisions have no pre-
emptive effect without the filed rate doctrine.139 When Congress 
passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and gave the FCC the 
power to eliminate the filed rate doctrine140—which was the proce-
dural mechanism for enforcing sections 201 and 202—it eliminated 
the preemptive effect of the FCA.141 While the substantive principles 
of sections 201 and 202 remain intact, consumers may now rely on 
state law to enforce these provisions.142 Even the FCC admitted that 
“consumers may have remedies under state consumer protection and 
contract laws.”143 
C.   Using the Circuit Split to Define the State’s Role in Proscribing 
Contractual Prohibitions of Classwide Arbitration 
 Because the FCA does not preempt state laws, the Seventh Cir-
cuit should have reviewed the arbitration agreement under the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act. Based on the Supreme Court’s “national policy 
favoring arbitration,”144 the court still could have upheld the parties’ 
decision to arbitrate. The only difference is that the court could also 
have allowed state laws—Illinois laws in this case—to determine 
whether the arbitration should proceed on a classwide basis, regard-
less of the contractual prohibition on class relief.145  
 If the Supreme Court follows this reasoning when it resolves the 
circuit split, it can eliminate a great deal of the dissension over 
Southland and prevent companies from using mandatory arbitration 
                                                                                                                      
 138. Id. at 1138.  
 139. Id. at 1138-40. 
 140. See Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 203 (2000). 
 141. See Ting, 319 F.3d at 1139. The substantive effects of sections 201-202 remain af-
ter the 1996 Act. The only difference is that parties may now enforce these provisions in 
state court. Id. at 1138-43.  
 142. Id. at 1138-43. 
 143. Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace, 12 F.C.C.R. 15,014, 15,057 (1997) (order 
on reconsideration) (emphasis added). 
 144. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). 
 145. Generally, courts refer to arbitration as a matter of contract and they respect the 
parties’ agreements accordingly.  See, e.g., Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 244 F.3d 
814, 819 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that under the congressional policy embodied in the 
FAA, parties may contractually waive their right to class action litigation). However, in 
situations where companies are completely prohibiting class relief through restrictive arbi-
tration clauses in adhesion contracts, courts should not defer to the parties’ right to con-
tract. Placing complete prohibitions on class relief in an arbitration agreement is against 
public policy because, among other things, it allows companies to avoid accountability for 
corporate misdeeds. See Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867-68 (Ct. App. 
2002); State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 279-80 (W. Va. 2002). In this type of 
situation, courts should defer to state law to determine whether arbitration should proceed 
on a classwide basis.  See generally Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 11, at 176 (arguing for 
a greater state role in commercial arbitration); see also, Note, supra note 123, at 388-89. 
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to create “virtual immunity”146 from class proceedings. While this ap-
proach still recognizes Southland’s “national policy” in favor of arbi-
tration,147 and requires courts to respect arbitration agreements ac-
cordingly, it returns power over arbitration procedure to the states. 
Therefore, under this approach, states still may not enact substan-
tive rules that undermine the enforceability of the parties’ decision to 
arbitrate, but states may enact procedural rules dealing with the 
fairness of the arbitration process itself. Thus, when faced with an 
arbitration agreement that prohibits both class actions and classwide 
arbitration, courts may uphold the parties’ decision to arbitrate, but 
review state law to determine whether to permit arbitration to pro-
ceed on a classwide basis, regardless of any contractual prohibitions 
on class relief. Such a solution serves the dual interest of advancing 
the parties’ decision to arbitrate—thereby respecting the “national 
policy” in favor of arbitration148—while preserving some authority 
over arbitration procedure for the states.149 Consequently, if states 
accept classwide arbitration as an effective method of dispute resolu-
tion, companies will no longer be able to use binding arbitration to 
avoid class relief.150  
IV.   JUSTIFYING STATE CONTROL AND CLASSWIDE ARBITRATION 
THROUGH PUBLIC POLICY AND ECONOMICS 
 Currently, only California, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina 
have explicitly accepted classwide arbitration as an effective method 
of dispute resolution.151 However, when faced with a choice of accept-
ing classwide arbitration or allowing companies to avoid class relief, 
presumably most—if not all—states will accept classwide arbitration. 
This Section explains the justifications for allowing states to prohibit 
                                                                                                                      
 146. Szetela, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 867 (stating that class relief prohibitions create “vir-
tual immunity from class or representative actions despite their potential merit”). 
 147. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See generally Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 11 (arguing for a greater state role 
in commercial arbitration); see also, Note, supra note 123, at 388-89. 
 150. The draft reporter’s notes for the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, which was re-
cently adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, indi-
cates that it may be appropriate for courts to invalidate arbitration provisions that use the 
elimination of class relief to undermine consumer rights. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF 
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, PROPOSED REVISIONS OF THE UNIFORM ARBI-
TRATION ACT, DRAFT FOR APPROVAL 36-37 (2000), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/ 
bll/ulc/uarba/arb0500.pdf (last visited Feb. 29, 2004); see also Thomas E. Carbonneau, Ar-
bitral Justice: The Demise of Due Process in American Law, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1945, 1955-67 
(1996) (arguing that companies are exploiting arbitration in ways that are detrimental to 
the system). 
 151. See Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349, 360 (S.C. 2002), overturned 
on other grounds, 123 S. Ct. 2402 (2003); Blue Cross of Cal. v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 779, 781 (Ct. App. 1998); Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 596 A.2d 860, 867 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).  
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preclusions of class relief, discredits the justification that consumer 
businesses use to validate their use of class relief preclusions, and 
leads into a discussion on some aspects of classwide arbitration that 
states may want to consider when adopting the classwide arbitral 
system.  
A.   Maintaining the “National Policy” while Proscribing  
Prohibitions on Class Relief 
 An important aspect of the proposal for returning greater powers 
over arbitration procedure to the states is that it respects the “na-
tional policy favoring arbitration.”152 The Supreme Court spent sev-
enty-five years developing this policy and it will not abandon it over-
night. However, several justices, and many states, disagree with the 
Court’s expansion of the FAA, and it seems likely that the Court’s 
policy will soon change.153 Adopting an approach that requires states 
to respect the parties’ decision to arbitrate while allowing state law 
to determine whether arbitration should proceed on a classwide basis 
is a practical compromise. It maintains the “national policy”154 while 
granting limited procedural powers to the states.155 More impor-
tantly, it also respects general public policy in favor of allowing par-
ties to proceed on a classwide basis. 
B.   Public Policy as Justification for Reform 
 “Classwide arbitration, as Sir Winston Churchill said of democ-
racy, must be evaluated, not in relation to some ideal but in relation 
to its alternatives.”156 If the alternative is to force hundreds of con-
                                                                                                                      
 152. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10. 
 153. See supra notes 77-89. 
 154. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10. 
 155. In Arbitration Federalism, Professors Hayford and Palmiter suggest a two-part 
“blueprint” for determining what role state law should have in the arbitration process.  
Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 11, at 203. “First, [the blueprint] is prohibitive: state law 
can neither be hostile to arbitration nor undermine the parties’ agreement. Second, [the 
blueprint] is hortatory: state law must seek to facilitate arbitration and to give content and 
effect to the parties’ choice.” Id. This Comment’s proposal meets both criteria by respecting 
the “national policy” in favor of arbitration, by respecting the parties’ decision to arbitrate, 
and by facilitating classwide arbitration. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10; see Hayford & 
Palmiter, supra note 11, at 203. 
 156. Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, 
Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 44 (2000) (quoting Keating v. 
Superior Court, 183 Cal. Rptr. 360, 377 (1982)). At least nine courts—most of which are in 
California—have held that arbitration clauses precluding class relief contributed to a find-
ing of unconscionability or to a finding that the arbitration clause must be severed. See 
Ting v. AT&T Corp., 319 F.3d 1126, 1150 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 53 (2003); 
Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2003); Comb v. PayPal, 
Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1175-76 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Acorn v. Household Int’l, Inc., 211 F. 
Supp. 2d 1160, 1170-71 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Luna v. Household Fin. Corp., 236 F. Supp. 2d 
1166, 1182-83 (W.D. Wash. 2002); Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 
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sumers to try their claims individually in arbitration, then classwide 
arbitration undoubtedly offers a superior option.157 There are at least 
three reasons why this is true. 
1.   Corporate Accountability 
 The West Virginia Supreme Court recently stated that permitting 
consumer companies to employ arbitration clauses that prohibit class 
relief “would go a long way toward allowing those who commit illegal 
activity to go unpunished, undeterred, and unaccountable.”158 While 
deterrence is a questionable rationale for promoting classwide arbi-
tration,159 holding consumer businesses accountable for illegal con-
duct is a definite benefit of protecting and developing the class arbi-
tration system.160 Companies employ mandatory arbitration clauses 
that preclude all class relief to discourage consumers from seeking 
legal redress. Any arbitration clause that attempts to avoid corporate 
accountability through a complete prohibition on class relief deserves 
judicial invalidation. Companies should not be able to create “virtual 
immunity”161 from class relief, and permitting states to proscribe this 
activity will hold corporations accountable for their actions. 
                                                                                                                      
1087, 1104-05 (W.D. Mich. 2000); In re Knepp, 229 B.R. 821, 843 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999); 
Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867-68 (Ct. App. 2002); Powertel, Inc. v. 
Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570, 576 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 
265, 280 (W. Va. 2002). But see Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, The Gold Rush of 
2002: California Courts Lure Plaintiffs’ Lawyers (but Undermine Federal Arbitration Act) 
by Refusing to Enforce “No-Class Action” Clauses in Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 58 
BUS. LAW. 1289, 1290-91 (2003) (arguing that courts should respect parties’ arbitration 
agreements even if they are adhesive in nature and citing several courts that have done 
so).  
 157. Sternlight, supra note 156, at 44; see also Lewis v. Prudential Bache Secs., Inc., 
225 Cal. Rptr. 69, 75 (Ct. App. 1986): 
 The alternative . . . is to force each . . . customer to individually arbitrate 
claims, most of which probably cannot justify the time and money required to 
prove. This case appears to offer no great difficulty in adapting arbitration to fit 
the class action mold, with adequate judicial supervision over the class aspects. 
Id. at 75. 
 158. Berger, 567 S.E.2d at 278-79. 
 159. See John Braithwaite & Toni Makkai, Testing an Expected Utility Model of Corpo-
rate Deterrence, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 7 (1991) (questioning the deterrent effect of corporate 
regulations); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Do People Want Optimal Deterrence?, 29 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 237 (2000) (questioning the role of deterrence in jury awards). 
 160. See Berger, 567 S.E.2d at 278-79; see also Szetela, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 868: 
By imposing this clause on its customers, Discover has essentially granted it-
self a license to push the boundaries of good business practices to their furthest 
limits, fully aware that relatively few, if any, customers will seek legal reme-
dies, and that any remedies obtained will only pertain to that single customer 
without collateral estoppel effect. The potential for millions of customers to be 
overcharged small amounts without an effective method of redress cannot be 
ignored. Therefore, the provision violates fundamental notions of fairness. 
 161. Szetela, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 867 (stating that class relief prohibitions create “vir-
tual immunity from class or representative actions despite their potential merit”); Keating, 
183 Cal. Rptr. at 375 (“If the right to a classwide proceeding could be automatically elimi-
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2.   Imperfect Information 
 Individual suits cannot serve the accountability function because 
many consumers are unaware of their potential claims against a 
company. If they do not know about the potential claims, then they 
cannot bring the individual suit. Therefore, allowing consumer com-
panies to force individual resolution of consumer claims will signifi-
cantly reduce their exposure to liability from corporate wrongdoing. 
One of the benefits of classwide arbitration is that it requires the 
parties to give notice to all potential class members.162 Thus, a single 
informed consumer can initiate a class proceeding and inform all 
class members about the potential recovery.163  
3.   Economic Feasibility 
 Even if individual consumers could easily learn of potential claims 
that they might have against consumer businesses, it is economically 
impractical for them to individually initiate the typical consumer ac-
tion because most claims of this nature have a “negative value.”164 
The potential recovery to the individual would be too small and the 
potential costs of the litigation would be too large to give the con-
sumer an adequate incentive to file the claim.165 Most attorneys 
would refuse to accept a case with such a minimal potential return, 
and “the vast majority of consumer claims involving relatively small 
sums of money . . . will be left without a remedy.”166 Classwide arbi-
tration solves this problem by “provid[ing] small claimants with a 
method of obtaining redress for claims which would otherwise be too 
small to warrant individual litigation.”167  
C.   The Defendant’s Economic Justification for Class Relief 
Prohibitions 
 Defendants in consumer actions have an economic argument of 
their own. They claim that arbitration clauses allow consumer busi-
nesses to lower their operating costs and pass those savings on to 
                                                                                                                      
nated in relationships governed by adhesion contracts through the inclusion of a provision 
for arbitration, the potential for undercutting these class action principles, and for chilling 
the effective protection of interests common to a group, would be substantial.”). 
 162. See AM. ARBITRATION ASSOC., SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS 
(effective Oct. 8, 2003), at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15747& 
JSPsrc=upload\LIVESITE\Rules_Procedures\National_International\..\Topics_Interest
\AAAClassaction.htm (last visited Feb. 29, 2004) [hereinafter AAA CLASS RULES].  
 163. Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Con-
sumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming March 2004) (manuscript at 19, on file with author). 
 164. Id. (manuscript at 18) (citing affidavit of Professor Edward F. Sherman). 
 165. Id.  
 166. In re Knepp, 229 B.R. 821, 842 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999). 
 167. Keating v. Superior Court, 183 Cal. Rptr. 360, 374 (1982).  
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customers.168 Essentially, these businesses advocate that prohibitions 
on class relief benefit consumers. This Section examines the efficient 
market theory and behavioralism in an effort to judge the legitimacy 
of the consumer businesses’ stance that lower costs to consumers 
should be the overriding concern in determining whether to allow 
prohibitions on class relief.  
1.   Efficient Markets? 
 Ultimately, the degree to which prohibitions on class relief result 
in lower costs to consumers is an empirical question, and, so far, no 
empirical data exists.169 Nevertheless, one can make assumptions 
about the extent that companies return savings to consumers based 
on general economic theory.170 Stated simply, whether a company will 
return savings to consumers rather than keep them as profits de-
pends on the level of competition in that company’s market. The only 
time consumers can absolutely expect to see such a return is when 
perfect competition exists.171 However, perfect competition rarely ex-
ists, especially among national consumer companies.172 Barriers to 
entry, dominant sellers, and heterogeneous products—factors that 
evidence imperfect competition—all exist in the major consumer 
markets.173 Thus, taking the position that consumer businesses re-
turn savings to consumers is a questionable position at best, and it 
                                                                                                                      
 168. See, e.g., Boomer v. AT&T Corp., 309 F.3d 404, 419 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[A]rbitration 
offers cost-saving benefits to telecommunication providers and ‘these benefits are reflected 
in a lower cost of doing business that in competition are passed along to customers.’”) (cit-
ing E. Ctr. for Conditioning & Health v. Qwest Communications Int’l, Inc., 294 F.3d 924, 
927 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1090 (2002)); see also Stephen J. Ware, Paying 
the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. 
DISP. RESOL. 89, 91 (“Assuming that consumer arbitration agreements lower the dispute-
resolution costs of businesses that use them, competition will (over time) force these busi-
nesses to pass their cost-savings to consumers.”). 
 169. Drahozal, supra note 37, at 764; see also Sternlight & Jensen, supra note 163 
(manuscript at 28) (“It is not surprising that, to date, no published studies show that the 
imposition of mandatory arbitration leads to lower prices.”). 
 170. Sternlight & Jensen, supra note 163 (manuscript at 24-33); see also Drahozal, su-
pra note 37, at 765:  
 In the absence of empirical evidence, whether one believes that individuals 
benefit from arbitration through reduced prices and higher wages, or instead 
that corporations use arbitration to take advantage of individuals and avoid 
their legal obligations, depends largely on one’s faith in the market as a means 
of allocating resources. 
 171. Sternlight & Jensen, supra note 163 (manuscript at 25). 
 172. See id. (manuscript at 26-27). Perfect competition only exists when four factors 
are present. First, there must be a sufficient amount of small buyers and small sellers so 
that one buyer or seller cannot manipulate the market. Second, the goods should be homo-
geneous, so that no company sells a unique product. Third, barriers to entry in the market 
must be very low. Finally, the market should be efficient in terms of information availabil-
ity. Id. (manuscript at 25-26). 
 173. See id. (manuscript at 26-27). But see Ware, supra note 168, at 91 (assuming 
without discussion that no barriers to entry exist in a market economy). 
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provides a weak argument for allowing companies to preclude all 
class relief.  
 Even if consumer businesses did return savings to consumers in 
the form of lower costs, lower costs are not the primary concern. 
Based on the accountability and economic rationales discussed above, 
courts should not allow consumer businesses to create “virtual im-
munity”174 from class relief. In fact, “the notion that it is to the pub-
lic’s advantage that companies be relieved of legal liability for their 
wrongdoing . . . is contrary to a century of consumer protection 
laws.”175 Thus, slightly higher costs are worthwhile if the alternative 
is allowing consumer businesses to continue with the illegal activity.  
2.   Recognizing Behavioralism as a Legitimate Concern? 
 While some consumers might be willing to pay slightly higher 
prices to preserve an opportunity to vindicate their rights, others 
might be willing to trade that opportunity for potentially lower costs, 
regardless of whether the lower costs will actually materialize and 
regardless of whether they will ever be in a situation where they 
would want to vindicate their rights. Essentially, consumers tend to 
be overoptimistic, believing—perhaps irrationally—that such a situa-
tion will never occur. Thus, even assuming that consumers would ac-
cept binding arbitration in return for a lower price—which itself as-
sumes that consumers accept the doubtful proposition that consumer 
companies return reduced costs to their customers—regulation to 
prevent companies from completely precluding class relief may be 
necessary to protect consumers from their own behavior.176  
 Should regulations be based solely on the basis of protecting con-
sumers from their own (potentially irrational) behavior? The answer 
is debatable.177 Ultimately, however, legal rules should not be created 
exclusively on (potentially false) assumptions about the rationality of 
consumers.178 Nevertheless, this does not mean that companies 
should be able to preclude all forms of class relief if a group of con-
sumers is willing to (perhaps irrationally) go along with it. Parallel 
concerns—namely, accountability for illegal conduct—exist to rein-
force the need for placing a prohibition on companies from participat-
                                                                                                                      
 174. See Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867 (Ct. App. 2002) (stating 
that class relief prohibitions create “virtual immunity from class or representative actions 
despite their potential merit”). 
 175. Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 931 n.16 (N.D. Cal. 2002), rev’d in part, Ting 
v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 176. Sternlight & Jensen, supra note 163 (manuscript at 29-30). 
 177. Compare Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: 
Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420 (1999), with Gregory 
Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New 
Behavioral Analysis of the Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907 (2002). 
 178. See Mitchell, supra note 177, at 2021.  
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ing in such activities. Thus, while basing regulation solely on as-
sumptions about consumers’ rationality is problematic, additional 
overriding concerns justify preventing companies from proscribing 
class relief.  
D.   States as Testing Grounds 
 The FAA does not provide detailed coverage of the arbitration 
process or the role that arbitrators play in that process.179 For exam-
ple, it does not specify how arbitrators should handle discovery, the 
availability of injunctive relief, requests for summary judgment, or—
most significantly in terms of this Comment—consolidation of multi-
ple arbitrations.180 Clarification on these issues must come from the 
states. 
 Since classwide arbitration is a relatively new phenomenon, states 
will want to develop rules and procedures to ensure the system is fair 
and efficient. This is a perfect role for the states as they can act as 
testing grounds to determine which procedures work and which do 
not.181 Indeed, states should start adopting procedures for classwide 
arbitration as soon as possible. This will give the Supreme Court an 
additional incentive to return greater authority over arbitration pro-
cedures to the states when it resolves the split between the Seventh 
and Ninth Circuits. The following Section describes some of the pro-
cedures that are particularly relevant for classwide arbitration that 
states should consider. 
V.   PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS FOR CLASSWIDE ARBITRATION 
 One of the most widely debated “obstacles” to classwide arbitra-
tion is the extent of judicial oversight that may be necessary to pro-
tect the due process rights of the parties.182 Essentially, courts and 
                                                                                                                      
 179. Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 11, at 200. 
 180. Id. at 200. According to Hayford & Palmiter, “the Supreme Court’s decision in Volt 
can be seen as an invitation for greater state participation in areas outside the FAA pre-
emptive core.” Id. at 211-12; see also Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford 
Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989) (stating that the FAA does not “reflect a congres-
sional intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration”). 
 181. See Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 11, at 211-12. How should states go about de-
veloping the classwide arbitration system? Relying on courts to develop classwide arbitra-
tion rules on a case-by-case basis through judicial interpretation of existing state arbitra-
tion acts may take years or even decades to create a coherent set of procedures. Asking 
state legislatures, on the other hand, to adopt bright line rules that would assist in the de-
velopment and institutionalization of the classwide arbitration system seems like a more 
efficient approach. Id. 
 182. See Keating v. Superior Court, 167 Cal. Rptr. 481, 491-92 (Ct. App. 1980) (stating 
that there are “no insurmountable obstacle[s]” to classwide arbitration and that limited ju-
dicial oversight is necessary to make the system work), vacated, 183 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1982), 
overturned on other grounds, Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); see also 
Sternlight, supra note 156, at 111-13 (arguing that courts must make the class certification 
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commentators disagree over the court’s involvement in the classwide 
arbitration process. Should the court select the arbitrator, certify the 
class, and assist in providing adequate notice to the class members? 
Or, may the arbitrator and parties perform these tasks? Earlier this 
year, the American Arbitration Association (AAA) adopted a set of 
supplemental rules on classwide arbitration that accept the latter al-
ternative and place all of the procedural responsibilities in the hands 
of the parties and the arbitrator.183 The remainder of this Section ex-
amines the AAA rules and discusses whether states may want to 
adopt these rules outright or adopt additional safeguards that may 
better protect both defendants and the class. 
A.   Selecting the Arbitrator 
 Unlike litigation, arbitration allows the parties to select the deci-
sion maker.184 If the parties agree to have only one arbitrator, then 
the procedure employed by the AAA is a common method of selecting 
                                                                                                                      
decision and assist in providing adequate notice to class members); Note, Classwide Arbi-
tration: Efficient Adjudication or Procedural Quagmire?, 67 VA. L. REV. 787, 806-808 
(1981) (arguing that arbitrators should make the class certification decision). The Virginia 
Law Review Note proposes that due process may not even apply in arbitration because 
there is no requisite state action. Id. at 800. However, this is unlikely because (1) parties 
cannot easily waive due process rights, and (2) some state action will probably be essential 
in classwide arbitration. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94-96 (1972) (discussing con-
siderations relevant to waiver of due process); Sternlight, supra note 156, at 111-13 (argu-
ing that courts must make the class certification decision and assist in providing adequate 
notice to class members). 
 183. AAA CLASS RULES, supra note 162, at Rule 2. The AAA adopted these rules after 
the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. 2402 
(2003). In Bazzle, the U.S. Supreme Court had to decide whether an arbitration agreement 
that is silent regarding the availability of classwide arbitration actually permits the par-
ties to proceed on a classwide basis. Id. at 2404. The South Carolina Supreme Court origi-
nally decided (1) that the arbitration agreement was silent as to whether parties could pro-
ceed with a classwide arbitration, and (2) that, given this silence, South Carolina law in-
terprets the contracts as permitting class arbitration proceedings. Id. The U.S. Supreme 
Court, in a plurality opinion, decided that this was essentially an issue of contract inter-
pretation and that the arbitrator, and not the court, must make the decision.  Id. at 2408. 
Therefore, the Court vacated the judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court and re-
manded the case to be resolved by the arbitrator. Id. Only three Justices joined Justice 
Breyer’s plurality opinion. Justice Stevens—solely in order to have a controlling opinion—
concurred in the judgment, but dissented on the Court’s decision to vacate the decision of 
the South Carolina Supreme Court. See id. at 2408-09. Stevens concluded that nothing in 
the FAA precluded the South Carolina Supreme Court from making the determination 
that the contract permitted classwide arbitration. Id. at 2408. Justice Thomas offered his 
standard dissent that the FAA should not apply in state courts and that the Court should 
have respected the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court. Id. at 2411. 
 184. Drahozal, supra note 37, at 708-09. This discussion assumes that the original con-
tract did not name the arbitrator or arbitrators in advance. If the parties named the arbi-
trator(s) in advance, this raises another ethical concern. The arbitrator(s) may be biased in 
favor of the company that drafted the contract. However, even if the parties did name the 
arbitrator(s) in advance, the conflict checks required by the AAA rules—along with the ar-
bitrator’s and arbitration institution’s financial incentive to avoid any appearance of bias–-
are sufficient to ensure a fair award.  
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that person.185 Parties must agree on an arbitrator from a list pro-
vided by the AAA, and submit that name to the AAA for approval.186 
If the parties cannot agree on one name, they must strike all objec-
tionable names and rank the remainder in order of preference.187 The 
highest ranking arbitrator wins.188 For a panel of three arbitrators, 
the parties each choose one, and those two choose the third.189 The 
same principles apply in classwide arbitrations, but the procedure is 
slightly different. The Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations 
require parties to select at least one arbitrator from the AAA’s “na-
tional roster of class arbitration arbitrators.”190  
 Since the class attorney makes the selection for the class, an im-
portant due process concern arises in the selection process.191 The 
class attorney may attempt to choose an arbitrator who will act in 
the best interest of the class attorney rather than that of the class. 
Professor Sternlight contends that courts must occupy a role in se-
lecting the arbitrator in classwide proceedings to protect absent class 
members.192 “Without court supervision of the formation and treat-
ment of the arbitral class action, this means that the absent class 
members will ultimately be bound by the ruling of an arbitrator they 
had absolutely no role in selecting.”193  
 While it may be true that the class attorney and class members 
have potentially conflicting interests,194 Professor Sternlight’s con-
cerns are slightly overstated. The class attorney has an ethical duty 
to act in the best interest of the class as a whole by selecting a fair 
and unbiased arbitrator. The arbitrator, in turn, has a duty to dis-
                                                                                                                      
 185. See AM. ARBITRATION ASSOC., COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION 
PROCEDURES Rule 11 (amended and effective July 1, 2003), available at 
http://www.adr.org/index2.1jsp?JSPssid=15747&JSPsrc=upload\LIVESITE\Rules_Proced
ures\National_International\..\..\focusArea\commercial\AAA235current.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 29, 2004) [hereinafter AAA COMMERCIAL RULES].  
 186. Id. at Rule 11(a). 
 187. Id. at Rule 11(b). 
 188. Id.  
 189. Id. at Rule 13(c). 
 190. AAA CLASS RULES, supra note 162, at Rule 2(a). 
 191. Sternlight, supra note 156, at 111-12. 
 192. Id. Another common argument against arbitration in general is the effect that “re-
peat player” status may have on the outcome of the arbitration. Essentially, some commen-
tators argue that corporations, as “repeat players” in arbitration, have a distinct advantage 
because arbitrators have an incentive to award in favor of the corporation so that the cor-
poration will repeatedly choose that arbitrator. However, such an argument ignores three 
important facts. First, both parties to an arbitration participate in the selection process. 
Second, plaintiff’s attorneys may also be “repeat players.” Finally, arbitration institutions 
go to great lengths to remove any possibility of bias, including the enactment of disclosure 
rules that arbitrators must comply with before being approved for a particular case. See 
Drahozal, supra note 37, at 709-10, 751, 769-70. 
 193. Sternlight, supra note 156, at 112.  
 194. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class 
Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1417-21 (1995). 
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close any conflicts of interest that may prevent him or her from ren-
dering a fair opinion.195 Additionally, arbitration institutions have 
great financial incentives to avoid any appearance of bias. If an insti-
tution obtains a reputation for bias, it risks losing credibility, which 
courts rely upon to enforce arbitral awards.196 “There is little reason 
to use an institution whose awards are not enforced by the courts.”197 
Accordingly, arbitration organizations take special precautions to en-
sure that their arbitrators are fair and unbiased. 
 Based on this reasoning, requiring courts to oversee the selection 
of the arbitrator in a class arbitration proceeding seems unnecessary. 
Sufficient safeguards exist to ensure that all parties—defendants, 
named plaintiffs, and absent class members—receive a fair decision-
maker.  Thus, states should be satisfied with the current level of pro-
tections in the selection process. 
B.   Contract Interpretation & Class Certification 
 Under Rule 3 of the AAA’s Supplementary Rules for Class Arbi-
trations, the first duty of the arbitrator is to determine, in a written 
opinion, whether the arbitration agreement permits the arbitration 
to proceed on a classwide basis.198 Essentially, the arbitrator inter-
prets the contract and then issues what the rules call a “Clause Con-
struction Award.”199 Following the issuance of the award, parties 
have thirty days to ask a court of competent jurisdiction to confirm or 
vacate the arbitrator’s decision.200 After the court confirms or vacates 
the decision, it returns the case to the arbitrator who then has to de-
cide—under Rule 4 of the AAA’s Supplementary Rules—whether to 
                                                                                                                      
 195. See AAA COMMERCIAL RULES, supra note 185, at Rule 16(a): 
 Any person appointed or to be appointed as an arbitrator shall disclose to the 
AAA any circumstance likely to give rise to justifiable doubt as to the arbitra-
tor’s impartiality or independence, including any bias or any financial or per-
sonal interest in the result of the arbitration or any past or present relationship 
with the parties or their representatives. Such obligation shall remain in effect 
throughout the arbitration. 
 196. Drahozal, supra note 37, at 752. 
 197. Id. at 769. 
 198. AAA CLASS RULES, supra note 162, at Rule 3. By allowing the arbitrator to make 
the contract interpretation, the rules are consistent with Bazzle, but Bazzle is only a plu-
rality opinion. 123 S. Ct. 2402 (2003). Justices Breyer, Scalia, Souter, and Ginsburg felt 
that the arbitrator should make the contract interpretation. Id. at 2408. Justices 
Rehnquist, O’Connor, and Kennedy felt that the South Carolina Supreme Court was the 
correct body to make the contract interpretation, but that the South Carolina Court made 
an incorrect ruling. Id. at 2409. Justice Stevens felt that the court should not disturb the 
decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court, but voted to allow the arbitrator to inter-
pret the contract so that the court would have a controlling opinion. Id. at 2408-09. Justice 
Thomas issued his standard dissent that the FAA does not apply in state courts and that 
the Court should let the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court stand. Id. at 2411. 
 199. AAA CLASS RULES, supra note 162, at Rule 3. 
 200. Id.  
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certify the class.201 Rule 4 essentially mirrors Rule 23 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure by outlining the conditions that the arbitra-
tor should consider when making the certification decision.202 If the 
arbitrator chooses to certify the class, each party again has thirty 
days to ask a court of competent jurisdiction to confirm or vacate the 
award.203  
 There are three concerns with the AAA’s certification process. 
First, it creates a potential financial conflict of interest for the arbi-
trator. Also, it may not adequately protect the due process rights of 
the parties. Finally, it may be more complicated and time-consuming 
than necessary. Each is a legitimate concern that states should con-
sider before adopting similar rules. 
1.   A Financial Conflict of Interest? 
 Arbitrators may have a financial incentive to certify a class be-
cause the longer the arbitrator spends on the case the more money 
the arbitrator receives. This seems like a fairly strong argument in 
favor of letting the court certify the class. However, the concern is 
misplaced. As discussed in Part V.A, arbitration institutions, and ar-
bitrators as well, have incredibly strong financial incentives to avoid 
any appearance of bias. They simply cannot survive economically if 
they cannot maintain an impartial appearance.204 Thus, the existence 
of a potential financial conflict of interest should not prevent the ar-
bitrator from making the certification decision because sufficient 
safeguards exist to neutralize the potential conflict.  
                                                                                                                      
 201. Id. at Rule 4(a). 
 202. See id. Rule 4(a) of the AAA’s Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration requires 
the following elements: 
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of separate arbitrations on behalf of all 
members is impracticable; 
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; 
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims 
or defenses of the class; 
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of 
the class; 
(5) counsel selected to represent the class will fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of the class; and 
(6) each class member has entered into an agreement containing an arbitration 
clause which is substantially similar to that signed by the class representa-
tive(s) and each of the other class members. 
Id. at Rule 4(a); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 203. AAA CLASS RULES, supra note 162, at Rule 5(d). 
 204. See Drahozal, supra note 37, at 709, 752, 769-70. If an institution obtains a repu-
tation for bias, it risks losing credibility, which courts rely upon to enforce arbitral awards. 
Id. at 752. “There is little reason to use an institution whose awards are not enforced by 
the courts.” Id. at 769. 
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2.   Protecting Due Process? 
 The process of certification is critical because it determines not 
only whether plaintiffs may initiate a representative suit, but also 
how that suit will be structured to ensure that the class members’ in-
terests are adequately represented.205 Thus, “[w]hether a class is cer-
tified and how its membership is defined can often have a decisive ef-
fect not only on the outcome of the litigation[,] but also on its man-
agement.”206 Because of this, Professor Sternlight believes that allow-
ing arbitrators to decide the certification issue will not comply with 
the Due Process Clause.207 According to Sternlight, “judges are sub-
stantially burdened by the responsibility of protecting the interests of 
absent class members, and . . . [arbitrators] may not yet have 
reached the point at which they are deemed equally capable of pro-
tecting individuals’ critical due process interests.”208 However, some 
evidence contrary to Professor Sternlight’s view exists. Arbitrators 
often handle large, complex disputes.209 The AAA, for example, has a 
“national roster of class arbitration arbitrators” who are especially 
skilled to handle classwide arbitration cases.210 Additionally, arbitra-
tors handling class arbitrations will have the assistance of the par-
ties’ counsel and the parties’ experts during the certification stage. 
Finally, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4 of 
the AAA’s Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations provide suffi-
cient guidance to assist the arbitrator in making the class determina-
tion.211 Thus, given arbitrators’ training and experience, and the 
various means of assistance available to arbitrators during the certi-
fication process, arbitrators are sufficiently capable of protecting the 
due process interests of absent class members.212  
                                                                                                                      
 205. Sternlight, supra note 156, at 112. 
 206. Id. (citing MANUAL FOR COMPLEX CIVIL LITIGATION § 30.1 (3d ed. 1995)). 
 207. Id. at 112-14. 
 208. Id. at 113-14. 
 209. See, e.g., Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987) (stating 
that “arbitral tribunals are readily capable of handling the factual and legal complexities 
of antitrust claims, notwithstanding the absence of judicial instruction and supervision”); 
see also Note, supra note 182, at 806-08 (arguing that arbitrators should make the class 
certification decision).  
 210. See AAA CLASS RULES, supra note 162, at Rule 2(a). 
 211. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23; AAA CLASS RULES, supra note 162, at Rule 4.  
 212. See Note, supra note 182, at 806-08; see also Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 123 
S. Ct. 2402, 2408 (2003) (remanding the case to allow the arbitrator to determine whether 
the arbitration agreement permitted class actions). In Bazzle, the arbitrator already had 
made one class determination and a class award. Id. at 2405. However, the Court re-
manded the case for the arbitrator to make the decision again because the Court believed 
the first decision may have been influenced by the lower court. Id. at 2408. 
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3.   Streamlining the Procedures 
 Even though arbitrators are qualified to interpret the contract 
and make the class certification decision, the AAA’s procedure re-
garding these decisions seems unnecessarily excessive and time-
consuming. After both the Clause Construction Award and the Class 
Determination Award, the arbitrator issues a thirty day stay to allow 
parties to appeal the decision to a court of competent jurisdiction.213 
Instead of issuing a thirty day stay after each award, why not have 
the arbitrator make both decisions at the same time and let the court 
review them simultaneously? This would reduce both the length of 
the arbitration and the burden on the reviewing court. Alternatively, 
the arbitrator could issue the Clause Construction Award, send it to 
the reviewing court for confirmation, and allow the court to make the 
class certification decision while it reviews the arbitrator’s decision 
on the Construction Award. This might alleviate some of the due 
process and financial conflicts of interest concerns discussed in Parts 
V.B.1 & V.B.2 above. However, allowing the court to become so intri-
cately involved at this stage “might infringe on the procedural flexi-
bility traditionally accorded to arbitrators.”214 Therefore, states may 
want to adopt a policy where (1) the arbitrator makes the contract in-
terpretation and the certification decision at the same time, and (2) 
the court does not review the decisions until it reviews the final 
award. This would allow the reviewing court to evaluate all of the 
arbitrator’s decisions at once and maintain some of the procedural 
flexibility inherent in the arbitration process.215 
 Any of these options could work. The point is that it is not entirely 
clear which option is the best. Because it is unclear, this is a good 
area for states to adopt differing policies and act as “testing grounds” 
to determine which procedure is the most desirable and why. 
Through experimentation at the early stages of classwide arbitra-
tion’s development, states can assist in building a more sound class 
arbitration system by developing the most fair and efficient certifica-
tion process possible.  
C.   Notice & Settlement 
 Regardless of who makes the certification decision, the arbitrator 
should undertake the responsibility of overseeing the notification 
process. Rule 6 of the AAA’s Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitra-
tions directs arbitrators to ensure that class members receive ade-
                                                                                                                      
 213. AAA CLASS RULES, supra note 162, at Rules 3, 5(d). 
 214. Note, supra note 182, at 807-08 (arguing that the arbitrator should make the class 
certification decision and a court should not review it until the court reviews the final 
award). 
 215. See id.  
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quate notice in concise, plain, and “easily understood language.”216 
Rule 6 also provides detailed guidance on what information the no-
tice form should contain.217 Basically, the AAA’s Supplementary 
Rules are easy to understand, simple to implement, and well within 
the arbitrator’s area of professional competence. The same is true for 
the AAA’s Rule 8 on settlement. The arbitrator simply has to approve 
any deal reached between the parties, as long as the arbitrator de-
termines the deal is reasonable to all class members.218 Accordingly, 
the arbitrator should have control over the notice and settlement 
procedures. 
 However, one aspect of the AAA’s rule on settlements may concern 
some states. Rule 8 gives the arbitrator the power to refuse any set-
tlement that does not give class members a second chance to opt 
out.219 This rule “reflects concern that inertia and a lack of under-
standing may cause many class members to ignore the original ex-
clusion opportunity, while the identification of proposed binding set-
tlement terms may encourage a more thoughtful response.”220 The ob-
jection to such a rule is that a second opt out period will make it 
more difficult for the parties to reach a settlement agreement.221 
However, Rule 8 avoids this problem by providing the arbitrator with 
sufficient discretionary authority to make case-by-case determina-
tions on whether a second opt out is necessary based on the circum-
stances surrounding the arbitration.222 Therefore, giving the arbitra-
                                                                                                                      
 216. AAA CLASS RULES, supra note 162, at Rule 6(b). 
 217. Id. The Notice must concisely state in plain, easily understood language:  
(1) the nature of the action; 
(2) the definition of the class certified; 
(3) the class claims, issues, or defenses; 
(4) that a class member may enter an appearance through counsel if the mem-
ber so desires, and that any class member may attend the hearings; 
(5) that the arbitrator will exclude from the class any member who requests ex-
clusion, stating when and how members may elect to be excluded; 
(6) the binding effect of a class judgment on class members; 
(7) the identity and biographical information about the arbitrator, the class 
representative(s) and class counsel that have been approved by the arbitrator 
to represent the class; and 
(8) how and to whom a class member may communicate about the class arbitra-
tion, including information about the AAA Class Arbitration Docket (see Rule 
9). 
Id. In fact, the AAA’s notice provisions mimic the requirements of the Federal Judicial 
Center’s proposed amendments to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
took effect in December of 2003. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (Federal Judicial Center, 
Proposed Draft) (effective Dec. 2003) [hereinafter PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULE 23]. 
 218. AAA CLASS RULES, supra note 162, at Rule 8. 
 219. Id. at Rule 8(c). 
 220. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULE 23, supra note 217, at 40. The AAA’s Supple-
mentary Rules on Class Arbitration are modeled after the proposed amendments to Rule 
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2003.  
 221. See id. at 41. 
 222. See id. 
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tor the authority to refuse any settlement that fails to offer a repeat 
opt out period should help rather than harm the class arbitration 
proceeding. 
D.   Reasoned Opinions 
 Possibly the most positive aspect of the AAA’s Supplementary 
Rules for Class Arbitrations is that the rules require the arbitrator to 
explain—in written opinions—all decisions made during the process. 
Commercial arbitration awards typically do not set forth the facts of 
the dispute, do not identify the applicable law and contract language, 
and do not explain how the arbitrator applied the applicable law and 
contract language to the facts in order to resolve the parties’ dis-
agreement.223 Rules 3, 5, and 7 of the AAA’s Supplemental Rules for 
Class Arbitrations alter this traditional feature of arbitration by re-
quiring the arbitrator to provide written opinions at three stages in 
the arbitration hearing. First, the arbitrator has to explain his or her 
initial contract interpretation in a “Clause Construction Award.”224 
Afterwards, in the certification proceeding, the arbitrator has to pro-
vide a reasoned opinion for why the class should or should not be cer-
tified.225 Finally, the arbitrator has to issue a written final award on 
the merits of the arbitration.226 
 Considering the size and complexity of classwide hearings, rea-
soned opinions seem necessary to ensure that arbitrators accurately 
understood the nature of the controversy. In fact, requiring reasoned 
opinions will eliminate some of the uncertainty associated with arbi-
tration hearings and will provide benefits to both plaintiffs and de-
fendants. First, written opinions will reassure parties that the arbi-
trator committed time and gave thought to their dispute.227 A rea-
soned opinion shows respect for parties’ views. Futhermore, the opin-
ion requirement will reduce the likelihood of parties feeling that the 
arbitrator treated them unfairly.228 More importantly, without a rea-
soned opinion, parties do not know how to attack the award on ap-
peal.229 “By forgoing a reasoned award, the arbitrator renders undis-
coverable the primary bases upon which an attempt to vacate the 
award can be founded: inaccurate arbitral findings of fact, incorrect 
                                                                                                                      
 223. Stephen L. Hayford, A New Paradigm for Commercial Arbitration: Rethinking the 
Relationship Between Reasoned Awards and the Judicial Standards for Vacatur, 66 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 443, 444 (1998). 
 224. AAA CLASS RULES, supra note 162, at Rule 3. 
 225. Id. at Rule 5. 
 226. Id. at Rule 7. 
 227. Christopher B. Kaczmarek, Public Law Deserves Public Justice: Why Public Law 
Arbitrators Should Be Required to Issue Written, Publishable Opinions, 4 EMPLOYEE 
RIGHTS & EMP. POL’Y J. 285, 314-15 (2000). 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id.  
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interpretations or applications of relevant law or contract language, 
or both.”230 Consequently, the absence of a reasoned opinion means 
that judicial vacatur is virtually precluded.231 While reasoned opin-
ions will subject arbitration awards to greater judicial scrutiny—and 
thereby increase the costs of arbitration—the requirement is neces-
sary to protect the parties’ right to appeal under Section 10 of the 
FAA,232 especially in the context of classwide arbitration.233 There-
fore, the benefits to reasoned awards far outweigh their potential 
costs, and instituting a reasoned opinion requirement in the early 
stages of classwide arbitration’s development is an appropriate and 
necessary measure to ensure that classwide arbitration is a fair and 
efficient proceeding for all parties.  
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 Over the last fifty years, the Supreme Court has developed a “na-
tional policy favoring arbitration”234 by expanding the preemptive ef-
fect of the Federal Arbitration Act far beyond Congress’ original in-
tent.235 Many lower courts have relied on this “national policy” to ef-
fectively eliminate any review of arbitration agreements under state 
laws of unconscionability. As a result, the Supreme Court has unwit-
tingly encouraged companies to employ arbitration clauses in con-
sumer contracts as a method of depriving consumers of certain types 
of relief. Banks, phone companies, and other large consumer busi-
nesses now use mandatory arbitration agreements to immunize 
themselves from class actions and classwide arbitration. As potential 
defendants, they hope that courts will rely on the Supreme Court’s 
“national policy” to uphold their arbitration agreements and force in-
dividual resolution of all consumer claims against them.  
                                                                                                                      
 230. Hayford, supra note 223, at 445. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000). Judicial review under § 10 of the 
FAA is limited to four grounds: fraud, partiality, misconduct in refusing to postpone a 
hearing, and an arbitrator exceeding his or her powers. Id. § 10(a)(1)-(4). Additionally, all 
of the federal circuits, and several of the states, have adopted manifest disregard as an 
added ground for vacatur. See 1 DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 33.08 (2003). 
 233. Organizations other than the AAA are also starting to acknowledge the potential 
value of having arbitrators provide written opinions. For example, in the Center for Public 
Resources’ proposed rules and commentary for the arbitration of business disputes, the 
Center stated that “[a]ll awards shall be in writing and shall state the reasoning on which 
the award rests unless the parties agree otherwise.” CTR. FOR PUB. RES. INST. FOR DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION, RULES FOR NON-ADMINISTERED ARBITRATION Rule 14.2 (effective Sept. 15, 
2000), available at www.cpradr.org/arb-rules.htm#14 (last visited Feb. 29, 2004). 
 234. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). 
 235. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 284 (1995) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); id. at 285 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Southland, 465 U.S. at 25 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 
395, 420 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting); see also Drahozal, supra note 37, at 701.  
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 Should the “national policy” work as a shield to protect defendants 
from having to provide any form of class relief? The Supreme Court 
will have an opportunity to address this question when it resolves a 
split between the Seventh and Ninth Circuits on the interplay of the 
Federal Arbitration Act, the Federal Communications Act, and state 
laws of unconscionability.236 Considering the Court’s sensible desire 
to sustain the legitimacy of its “national policy” in favor of arbitra-
tion, one practical compromise would be to uphold the parties’ 
agreement to arbitrate, but allow state law to determine whether the 
arbitration may proceed on a classwide basis. This proposal main-
tains the “national policy favoring arbitration” while returning addi-
tional authority over arbitration procedure to the states.  
 Currently, only a few states have explicitly adopted classwide ar-
bitration as an alternative form of dispute resolution. However, when 
faced with the possibility of accepting classwide arbitration or allow-
ing companies to continue avoiding class relief, presumably most—if 
not all—states will adopt a system of classwide arbitration. In fact, if 
states start accepting such a system now, and adopting rules and 
procedures to develop it, this will give the Supreme Court greater in-
centive to return authority over arbitration policies to them when it 
resolves the split between the Seventh and Ninth Circuits.  
                                                                                                                      
 236. Compare Ting v. AT&T Corp., 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding (1) that the 
Federal Communications Act does not preempt state laws of unconscionability, and (2) that 
the FAA does preempt the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act’s ban on waivers of 
class actions, but that the FAA makes arbitration agreements subject to state laws of un-
conscionability, which the 9th Circuit used to invalidate the parties’ agreement in this 
case), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 53 (2003), with Boomer v. AT&T Corp., 309 F.3d 404 (7th Cir. 
2002) (holding that the Federal Communication Act preempts state laws of unconscionabil-
ity). 
